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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DUE PROCESS - STATE COURT JURISDICTION
- QUASI IN REM PROCEEDINGS - The United States Supreme Court
has held that all assertions of state court jurisdiction, in personam,
in rem, and quasi in rem, must comply with the minimum contacts
standards of International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977).
Heitner, a nonresident of Delaware and a shareholder in Grey-
hound, a business incorporated in Delaware, filed a shareholder's
derivative suit' in the Court of Chancery for New Castle County,
Delaware, against Greyhound, its subsidiary, and twenty-eight
present and former officers and directors. Heitner alleged a breach
of the officers' and directors' fiduciary duties to Greyhound in caus-
ing the corporation to incur civil liability for damages in a private
antitrust action and a fine in a criminal contempt suit.2 To acquire
jurisdiction over the individual defendants, all nonresidents of Dela-
ware, Heitner filed a motion to sequester their Delaware property
pursuant to state law.' Since Delaware had statutorily declared it-
self to be the situs of ownership of stock in Delaware corporations,4
1. In a derivative suit, the plaintiff stockholder sues as guardian ad litem for the corpora-
tion which is made part of the litigation by being named a nominal party defendant although
it is the real party plaintiff. The derivative action is an equitable proceeding frequently
involving issues like breach of fiduciary responsibilities. H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORAMoNS
§ 358, at 749 (2d ed. 1970).
2. In the antitrust action, a judgment of $13,146,090 plus attorneys fees was entered
against Greyhound. Mt. Hood Stages, Inc. v. Greyhound Corp.,[1973-2] TRADE CAS. (CCH)
1 74,824 (D. Ore.), af/d, 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977). In the criminal action, Greyhound was
fined $100,000, and Greyhound Lines $500,000. United States v. Greyhound Corp., 363 F.
Supp. 525 (N.D. Ill. 1973), 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill.), af/d, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974).
3. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366 (1974) provides:
(a) If it appears in any complaint filed in the Court of Chancery that the defendant
is a nonresident of the State, the Court may make an order directing such nonresi-
dent defendant. . . to appear. . . . Such order shall be served on such nonresident
defendant . . . by mail or otherwise, if practicable, and shall be published in such
manner as the Court directs . . . . The Court may compel the appearance of the
defendant by the seizure of all or any part of his property, which property may be sold
under the order of the Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does
not appear, or otherwise defaults. Any defendant whose property shall have been so
seized and who shall have entered a general appearance in the cause may, upon notice
to the plaintiff, petition the Court for an order releasing such property . . . from the
seizure. The Court shall release such property unless the plaintiff shall satisfy the
Court that because of other circumstances there is a reasonable possibility that such
release may render it substantially less likely that plaintiff will obtain satisfaction of
any judgment secured.
4. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974) provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all courts
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the court granted the motion and had a court-appointed sequestra-
tor "seize" Greyhound stock and options owned by the individual
defendants, thereby obtaining the requisite jurisdiction over
twenty-one of the defendants.5
Defendants appeared specially to quash service of process and
vacate the sequestration order, arguing first that the sequestration
statute, as applied, violated their procedural due process rights.
Defendants also asserted that Delaware's exercise of jurisdiction in
the absence of the minimum contacts required by International
Shoe Co. v. Washington' deprived them of property in violation of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The court of
chancery, however, justified the sequestration statute and proce-
dure as merely compelling the nonresident defendant to enter a
personal appearance and defend a suit brought against him, where-
upon the property was released. The statute making Delaware the
situs of stock sufficed as a basis for the exercise of this quasi in rem
held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs of the ownership of
the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this State, whether
organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this State.
In contrast to the other 48 states that enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, Delaware did
not adopt U.C.C. § 8-317(1) which requires actual physical seizure of stock certificates to
effect an attachment or levy upon an interest in corporate securities. Although none of the
certificates associated with defendants' securities were physically located in Delaware, the
stock was regarded as present in the state and thus subject to seizure by virtue of DEL. CODE
tit. 8, § 169 (1974).
Prior to Shafter, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit ruled that the Delaware situs
statute, as applied in sequestration proceedings, failed to comply with constitutional require-
ments that jurisdiction be predicated on minimum contacts with the forum state. U.S.
Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976) (lone fact of statutory situs of stock was
not a sufficient contact with Delaware to support jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
in a suit evolving out of a transaction unrelated to the forum state), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct.
2972 (1977).
5. Since the property seized was stock and options in a Delaware corporation, the seques-
tration order was served on Greyhound's registered agent in Delaware. Seizure was accom-
plished by a stop-transfer order which prohibited the company from recognizing any transfer
of the securities of record pending further notice from the sequestrator or the court. For a
further discussion of the Delaware sequestration procedure see Folk & Moyer, Sequestration
in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. Rzv. 749, 755 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Folk & Moyer].
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). In International Shoe, the Supreme Court upheld the state of
Washington's right to exercise in personam jurisdiction over a foreign corporation engaged in
limited sales activities in Washington for the collection of the state's unemployment tax. The
Court held that due process only requires a defendant have such minimum contacts with the
forum that maintenance of the suit against him does not offend traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice. Id. at 316.
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jurisdiction by a Delaware court.'
Affirming the judgment of the chancery court, the Delaware Su-
preme Court found no breach of the defendants' due process rights.
The state of Delaware was held to have a legitimate interest in
protecting shareholders by allowing adjudication of claims of mis-
management involving Delaware corporations; adequate procedural
safeguards of notice and hearing were provided in the sequestration
statute itself.' Although extensively addressing the procedural due
process issue, the Delaware Supreme Court gave cursory treatment
to the minimum contacts aspect of the appellants' argument. The
court held that International Shoe only governed assertions of in
personam jurisdiction and was inapplicable where quasi in rem ju-
risdiction was exercised.? The defendants appealed to the United
States Supreme Court. Probable jurisdiction was noted and the
judgment of the Delaware Court was reversed.10
7. Heitner v. Greyhound Corp., No. 4514 (Ch. New Castle Co., Del. May 12, 1975). Under
DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366(a) (1974), if the plaintiff demonstrates that there is a substantial
possibility he may be unable to get satisfaction of any judgment rendered, the court will
refuse to release the sequestered property. See note 3 supra.
The constitutionality of the Delaware sequestration procedure was upheld in Breech v.
Hughes Tool Co., 41 Del. Ch. 128, 189 A.2d 428 (Sup. Ct. 1963). The court held that the state
of incorporation may constitutionally provide that the situs of the company's stock is in the
home state. Thus, stock of a domestic corporation whose certificates are physically located
elsewhere could be brought before the court by using the situs and sequestration statutes,
providing an adequate foundation for the court's assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction.
8. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976), rev'd, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977). See
text accompanying note 7 supra.
9. 361 A.2d at 229. A judgment in rem affects the interests of all persons in particular
property. A judgment in personam imposes personal liability or obligations on one person in
favor of another. A quasi in rem judgment determines interests of specific persons in desig-
nated property. RESTATEMENT OF JUGMENrs §§ 45, 46, 73-76 (1942). This casenote will use
"in rem" rather than distinguishing between "in rem" and "quasi in rem" unless otherwise
noted.
10. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977). The following facts led to a finding of
probable jurisdiction: defendants, whose Delaware property had been sequestered, were re-
quired to enter a general appearance to release their property, thus submitting to full in
personam jurisdiction on the underlying cause of action. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 5, at
778. No limited appearance in response to sequestration is permitted. Sands v. Lefcourt
Realty Corp., 35 Del. Ch. 340, 117 A.2d 365 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (sequestration statute compelling
nonresident defendant's appearance by seizure of his property allows no special appearance
by the defendant without subjecting himself to full in personam liability). If the decision of
the Delaware court was not regarded as an appealable final judgment under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257(2), appellants would have to either suffer default judgments or enter a general appear-
ance and defend on the merits. Consequently, the Court found the judgment final for all
practical purposes and probable jurisdiction was noted. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2576
& n.12. See also Brief for Appellant at 6, Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. 2569 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Brief for Appellant].
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Although the appellants raised the same two issues argued in the
Delaware courts, Justice Marshall, speaking for the majority, found
it necessary to consider only the question of minimum contacts and
did not explore appellants' procedural due process contentions."
The Delaware Supreme Court's conclusion that the minimum con-
tacts test was irrelevant where jurisdiction was based on the attach-
ment of property located within a state's borders rather than on the
contacts between a state and the defendant was founded on the
continued vitality of Pennoyer v. Neff. ,2 In holding that the power
of each court was necessarily restricted by the territorial boundaries
of the state in which it was established, Pennoyer curtailed the
availability of in personam jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants. A nonresident defendant could not be sued in the forum state
unless he could be found there. However, by virtue of the same
territorial jurisdiction concept, the state where property was situ-
ated had exclusive sovereignty over that property; thus, in rem suits
could be brought regardless of the owner's location. Since the owner
was held to be only indirectly affected by in rem judgments adverse
to his interest in the property, the courts did not view this exercise
of jurisdiction as in personam.' 3 The Court in Shaffer, however,
refused to acknowledge a practical difference between the rights
affected by in rem and in personam actions.
11. Shaffer v. Heitner, 97 S. Ct. at 2572 (1977). See also text accompanying note 7 supra.
12. 97 S. Ct. at 2576 (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877)). Neff was a nonresident
of Oregon and owned no property in that state when Mitchell brought suit against him there
for collection of attorney's fees. When Neff later acquired property in the state, Mitchell did
not attempt to attach it, but simply used it to assert jurisdiction over Neff as a property
owner, and notified him of the suit by publication, all in accordance with Oregon law. Neff
never appeared to defend and a default judgment was entered against him. Pennoyer bought
the land at a sheriff's sale held to satisfy the judgment. Neff then brought a suit in ejectment
against Pennoyer to contest the validity of the original assertion of jurisdiction. In awarding
the land to Neff, the U.S. Circuit Court for the District of Oregon held that it could not
recognize the judgment Mitchell had obtained against Neff as valid. The decision was af-
firmed by the Supreme Court.
13. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. at 720, 731. The Shaffer Court stated:
By concluding that "[tihe authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by
the territorial limits of the State in which it is established," . . . Pennoyer sharply
limited the availability of in personam jurisdiction over defendants not resident in the
forum State. If a nonresident defendant could not be found in a State, he could not
be sued there. On the other hand, since the State in which property was located was
considered to have exclusive sovereignty over that property, in rem actions could
proceed regardless of the owner's location.
97 S. Ct. at 2578.
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Marshall cited Schroeder v. City of New York, 14 where a decree
in an in rem condemnation proceeding had resulted in the loss of
individual property, as support for the proposition that persons are
directly affected by adverse in rem judgments. Mullane v. Central
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 15 another of the Supreme Court's land-
mark jurisdiction decisions, was found by the Shaffer Court to have
further weakened the in rem wing of Pennoyer. In Mullane, the
Court recognized that the hazy distinctions between in rem and in
personam actions are not dispositive of fourteenth amendment due
process rights. In light of Schroeder and Mullane, the majority con-
cluded that Pennoyer was no longer the foundation of the law of
state court jurisdiction and that the guidelines of "fair play and
substantial justice" announced in International Shoe should regu-
late all assertions of state court jurisdiction, in rem as well as in
personam.
With Pennoyer eradicated as the linchpin of jurisdiction, the
Court proceeded to explain why International Shoe was a fitting
replacement." Marshall reasoned that jurisdiction over property is
simply a concise way of referring to jurisdiction over the interests
of persons in property. Therefore, the foundations of any exercise of
in rem jurisdiction had to be sufficient to justify asserting jurisdic-
tion over the interests of persons. The minimum contacts rule of
International Shoe, having served as an adequate guide to deter-
mine if assertions of jurisdiction over persons met due process re-
quirements, was held by Shaffer to be the appropriate test to govern
jurisdiction over the interests of persons in property. 17
Delaware's assertion of jurisdiction was held unconstitutional by
the Shaffer Court because the minimum contacts required by
International Shoe were nonexistent. In the majority's opinion, the
statutory presence of appellants' Greyhound stock in Delaware pro-
14. 371 U.S. 208 (1962). The Court found that notice by newspaper publication and posted
signs failed to satisfy due process requirements with respect to a nonresident plaintiff whose
name and address were readily ascertainable from public records and whose property inter-
ests were directly affected by the condemnation proceedings in question. According to the
Court, property is immune from judgment unless reasonable and appropriate efforts are made
to give the owners actual notice of the action.
15. 339 U.S. 306 (1950) (due process of law does not depend on the distinctions between
in rem and in personam for this is an ambiguous and confusing classification which, being
primarily for state tribunals to define, varies from state to state).
16. 97 S. Ct. at 2581. See Folk & Moyer, supra note 5, at 773.
17. 97 S. Ct. at 2581-82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 56, Introduc-
tory Note (1971).
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vided insufficient contacts to support jurisdiction, since the prop-
erty was unrelated to the cause of action for breach of fiduciary
duties. Heitner's contention that appellants' positions as directors
and officers of a Delaware corporation furnished the requisite con-
tacts was also rejected by the Court because jurisdiction obtained
through the sequestration statute was based on the presence of
property in Delaware and not on appellants' positions in Grey-
hound."8
Justices Powell and Stevens, in concurring with the majority's
holding that minimum contacts should govern all exercises of state
court jurisdiction and that they were lacking here, argued the
Shaffer decision was needlessly sweeping. Both Justices reserved
judgment on the question of whether the case should be read to
invalidate in rem jurisdiction where the attached property, although
unrelated to the cause of action, is real estate located in the forum.,9
According to Powell, in these situations the suit may, absent more
contacts, comport with due process without need to resort to
International Shoe's uncertain "sufficient contacts" standard.20 In
his concurrence, Justice Stevens also found Delaware's sequestra-
tion procedure unconstitutional on procedural due process grounds
since it did not provide for an opportunity to defend on the merits
unless and until the defendants submitted to full in personam juris-
diction.2
Justice Brennan, concurring and dissenting, conceded that mini-
mum contacts should govern all assertions of state court jurisdiction
but sharply disagreed with both the way the majority reached the
contacts issue and the decision that sufficient contacts did not exist
here. Brennan contended that jurisdiction obtained using Delaware
18. Marshall saw the failure of Delaware to assert its alleged interest in policing corpora-
tions when enacting the sequestration statute as a fatal flaw in this argument. The absence
of any state concern to govern the affairs of Delaware corporations when the sequestration
statute is used to gain jurisdiction is exemplified by Heitner's inability to bring before the
court seven of the 28 defendants named in his complaint who did not own Delaware stock or
property. 97 S. Ct. at 2585-86.
19. Id. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring), 2587-88 (Stevens, J., concurring). Although the
entire Court was in accord with Marshall's holding that "minimum contacts" should regulate
all efforts to obtain state court jurisdiction, some Justices disagreed as to whether Shaffer
was the appropriate case to decide the issue.
20. Id. at 2587 (Powell, J., concurring).
21. Id. at 2588 (Stevens, J., concurring). In equating fair warning with fair notice, Stevens
saw Delaware's failure to warn purchasers of stock in Delaware corporations that as purchas-
ers they would be subject to in rem jurisdiction of Delaware as violative of due process.
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sequestration was quasi in rem in nature and not based on the
relationship among the parties, the litigation, or the state. Since
jurisdiction was premised upon stock ownership rather than upon
contacts between corporate fiduciaries and the state, the minimum
contacts question was not an issue.22 Brennan believed, however,
that if the contacts issue had been properly before the Court, suffi-
cient contacts existed between Delaware, the defendants, and the
litigation to justify asserting jurisdiction. A corporation and its offi-
cers and directors, Brennan argued, generally have sufficient mini-
mum contacts with the chartering state to fairly require them to
litigate a stockholder derivative suit involving the activities of the
officers and directors. Brennan reasoned that in resolving the mini-
mum contacts issue, Delaware's strong interest in adjudicating the
controversy must be accorded great weight. 3 The appellants, as
fiduciaries in a Delaware corporation, and Delaware, the chartering
state, had a voluntary association; the appellants enjoyed the bene-
fits and protections of Delaware's laws, and should be required in
return to respond to suits in the State of Delaware and to subject
themselves to general jurisdiction."4 Although the state's interests
would not provide minimum contacts in every case, such interests
were certainly present in derivative suits where, as in Shaffer, mis-
management was alleged. 5
The sequestration procedure at issue in Shaffer clearly illustrates
the unfairness of a Pennoyer approach to jurisdiction. Through a
Pennoyer creation, the quasi in rem proceeding, Delaware was able
22. Id. at 2588 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Brennan perceived the Court's
decision as the deathknell for quasi in rem jurisdiction, since now all statutes authorizing
state court jurisdiction would have to comply with the minimum contacts standard. Id. at
2589. But see notes 19 & 20 and accompanying text supra.
23. 97 S. Ct. at 2589-90 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). The interests of Dela-
ware in providing restitution to residents injured by corporate misbehavior, the manifest
regulatory interest of the chartering state in a stockholder's derivative suit, and the state's
interest in providing a convenient forum for policing the activities of an entity spawned solely
on the basis of its laws were the major reasons why Brennan felt that Delaware should hear
this suit. Id. at 2590.
24. Id. at 2592 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958)). In Hanson, Florida
attempted to exercise jurisdiction over trust assets in Delaware based on the settlor dece-
dent's establishment of a Florida domicile after executing the trust. The Supreme Court ruled
that the Florida courts lacked in rem jurisdiction over the action involving the trust because
the trust situs was in Delaware. Florida also lacked in personam jurisdiction over the trustee
since minimum contacts between the trustee and the state were nonexistent.
25. 97 S. Ct. at 2590 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). Brennan admitted that it
may have been better to allow another forum to hear the suit. Yet the issue, he retorted, was
"minimum" and not "best" contacts. Id. at 2592-93.
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to compel the defendants' general apliearance with only one link
between the controversy and the forum: the ownership of securities
issued by a Delaware corporation.2 ' The result was that only the
twenty-one defendants unfortunate enough to own Greyhound stock
had to bear the risk and burden of the litigation.Y Such an assertion
of jurisdiction where there were few, if any, additional contacts
between the defendant and the forum was not uncommon in quasi
in rem proceedings. But neither was it inevitable, for the legislatures
were usually silent on the question of whether they desired to sub-
ject these defendants to the decisions of their courts.Y Moreover, the
extension of in personam jurisdiction in International Shoe made
quasi in rem proceedings necessary only where minimum contacts
were lacking, precisely where due process should have commanded
that the defendants not be asked to defend. 29 The holding in Shaffer
was designed to eliminate this use of quasi in rem jurisdiction where
the property was unrelated to the cause of action. 0
Customarily, an assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction was justi-
fied by a state's interest in furnishing its citizens with convenient
legal recourse for wrongs committed against them by nonresidents.
Invoking quasi in rem jurisdiction was said to prevent the poten-
tially liable nonresident defendant from absconding with property
which could ultimately be used to satisfy a judgment against him.
However, no proof has ever been offered to support this rationale.
On the contrary, defendants could not circumvent payment of judg-
26. Folk and Moyer offered the extreme example of an Alaskan plaintiff suing a fellow
Alaskan, who owned stock in a Delaware corporation, in the Delaware courts, through a
Delaware attorney, for personal injuries that occurred in Alaska. Folk & Moyer, supra note
5, at 785.
Using an International Shoe standard in lieu of the problem-ridden sequestration statute
will usually require that the controversy arise out of the contacts between the parties, the
forum state, and the litigation. Assertions of quasi in rem jurisdiction based on the Delaware
sequestration procedure suffer no such limitation. Zammit, Quasi-In-Rem Jurisdiction: Out-
moded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST. JOHN's L. Rlv. 668, 676 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
Zammit]. But see note 39 and accompanying text infra.
27. See note 18 supra. See also Brief for Appellant, supra note 10, at 5.
28. See Carrington, The Modern Utility of Quasi In Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L. Rv.
303, 307 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Carrington].
29. Id. at 306. See also Folk & Moyer, supra note 5, at 780.
30. See, e.g., Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905) (debt may be attached wherever the
defendant's debtor can be found even if the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in the
forum state). The majority impliedly struck down both Harris and Pennoyer when it declared
that prior decisions inconsistent with the minimum contacts standard were overruled. 97 S.
Ct. at 2585 n.39.
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ments rendered against them by removing assets from the forum
state; all valid in personam judgments are enforceable in sister
states under the full faith and credit clause.31 The state where the
defendant absconded with the assets also has the power to attach
that property as security for a judgment rendered in the forum state
where the suit was heard in harmony with the rules of International
Shoe. 32 In view of these existing safeguards, the claimed virtues of
quasi in rem jurisdiction are totally unsubstantiated. 33
Though the Court stopped short of directly overruling Pennoyer,
Shaffer effectively emasculated Pennoyer's in rem aspect, replacing
it with a more realistic and reasonable minimum contacts test that
considers the due process rights of the parties and the state in terms
of fairness.34 The switch to minimum contacts will be an improve-
31. 97 S. Ct. at 2583. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides: "Full Faith and Credit shall be
given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State." This constitutional provision means a valid final judgment is to be given the same
force and effect in other states, with respect to the issues litigated in the forum state. Recogni-
tion and enforcement by sister states is not required, however, if judgment was entered by a
.court of the forum state without jurisdiction. C. MURPHY, JR., INTRODUCTION TO LAw, LEGAL
PROCESS, AND PROCEDURE 45 (1977).
32. 97 S. Ct. at 2583. See also Carolina Power and Light Co. v. Uranex, 46 U.S.L.W. 2194
(N.D. Cal. 1977) (California may attach debt owed to defendant as security for suit properly
brought in North Carolina; Shaffer cited).
33. See also Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1142-43 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons,
J., concurring). In Jonnet, the court of appeals affirmed a district court ruling dissolving a
foreign attachment served in Pennsylvania on a New York bank, holding Pennsylvania's
foreign attachment statutes an unconstitutional breach of the defendant's procedural due
process rights. See generally Note, Foreign Attachment Power Constrained-An End to Quasi
In Rem Jurisdiction?, 31 U. MIAMn L. REv. 419, 421 (1977).
It is of no importance that quasi in rem jurisdiction has traditionally been acquired using
property unrelated to the underlying controversy. The Supreme Court has declared that the
ancient lineage of a procedural rule cannot insure its constitutionality under the due process
clause. 97 S. Ct. at 2584 (citing Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969)
(invalidating statute authorizing garnishment of wages without allowing debtor an opportu-
nity to be heard or to defend before trial)).
. 34. Cf. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633,
637 (1967) (lower court's exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction upheld on basis of fairness and
minimum contacts); Bekins v. Huish, 1 Ariz. App. 258, 262, 401 P.2d 743, 745 (1965)
("Pennoyer v. Neff, though never expressly overruled, is no longer in the mainstream of the
constitutional law of this country"). See generally Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court
Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REV. 241, 248 [hereinafter cited as Hazard].
Although Shaffer deals a staggering blow to the usual distinctions drawn between jurisdic-
tion over the person and over property, these concepts may be too solidly entrenched in
jurisprudence for quasi in rem jurisdiction to be completely eliminated. See generally Folk
& Moyer, supra note 5, at 782. Yet, as shown in Shaffer, injustices may result where courts
draw mechanical distinctions between in rem and in personam and use separate tests to
regulate these two types of procedures. See Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37
TEx. L. Rav. 657, 663 (1959). This classification system is ineffective where the case cannot
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ment, for it will take into consideration numerous factors Pennoyer
overlooked. Factors like the state's interest in hearing a suit (which
Brennan viewed as crucial to determining if jurisdiction exists) and
the convenience of the parties were irrelevant under Pennoyer, for
its central concept was that jurisdiction depends solely on a court's
physical power over the person or the property.3 This traditional
approach to jurisdiction cannot assure the plaintiff an appropriate
forum and fails to shield the defendant from a capricious choice of
forum. A minimum contacts inquiry, however, compels courts to
analyze and balance the conflicting interests involved in order to
reach a fair result in each case. The plaintiff is guaranteed an appro-
priate forum in which to bring his action while the defendant is
protected against an unreasonable choice of forum.36 Moreover, the
judicial extension of the minimum contacts test to all exercises of
state jurisdictional power will eliminate the "patchwork of legal and
factual fictions that has been generated from the decision in
Pennoyer 37 because its rigid categories proved unsuitable for cer-
tain types of litigation.3
be easily pigeonholed within the standard in rem and in personam categories. See Develop-
ments in the Law - State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HAtv. L. REv. 909, 955 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Developments]. It is more practical to apply one standard to all kinds of actions -
in rem, in personam, and quasi in rem - and the flexible minimum contacts rule of
International Shoe is unquestionably the most plausible standard.
35. 97 S. Ct. at 2579-80. Justice Holmes viewed physical power as the foundation of
jurisdiction. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1915). Physical power is control over a
person or thing actually present within the territorial limits of the state. Johnston, The
Fallacy of Physical Power, 1 J. MAR. J. OF PRAC. AND PRoc. 37, 47 (1967) [hereinafter cited
as Johnston]. Under Pennoyer, a court's ability to render a judgment personally binding
upon the defendant hinged on its power over the defendant's person. Thus in personam
judgments were only valid where the defendant was physically within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the court. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See Folk
& Moyer, supra note 5, at 778. See also Johnston, supra, at 58. See generally Developments,
supra note 34, at 956.
36. Although minimum contacts is preferable to sequestration as the test of state court
jurisdiction, it is difficult to apply such a vague standard. Hazard, supra note 34, at 283.
Quasi in rem jurisdiction, based purely and simply on the presence of property within the
forum, avoids the uncertainty frequently associated with a contacts analysis. 97 S. Ct. at
2584. But cf. Carrington, supra note 27, at 309 (often proceedings based on quasi in rem
jurisdiction produce significant amounts of uneconomical litigation unrelated to the merits).
Procedural due process, however, is not meant to advance the interests of efficiency and
simplicity by sacrificing fair play and substantial justice. 97 S. Ct. at 2584. See Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) (prejudgment replevin statutes that denied opportunity
to be heard before seizure of property invalidated).
37. 97 S. Ct. at 2588 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
38. In Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927), the Supreme Court stretched the territorial
limitations of jurisdictional power imposed by Pennoyer to the breaking point. The increase
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International Shoe, which enunciated the minimum contacts
standard, requires only such contacts with the forum state as will
make it reasonable to compel a person to defend in that jurisdic-
tion. 9 Thus, the act or thing providing the nexus between the defen-
dant and the forum need not always be the same as the one underly-
ing the controversy, and minimum contacts requirements can be
satisfied if some reasonable relationship exists between the out-of-
state defendants, the suit, and the forum state." Since Shaffer de-
clared that International Shoe's minimum contacts rule applies to
any attempt to secure jurisdiction over nonresidents or their inter-
ests in property, the question is whether quasi in rem remains a
viable form of jurisdiction or has become meaningless in light of the
minimum contacts inquiry." Shaffer effectively requires that courts
of interstate highway travel gave rise to more accidents involving nonresident drivers. The
state courts were powerless to acquire in personam jurisdiction under Pennoyer once the
nonresident left the state. To alleviate this problem the Court allowed the creation of a fiction
referred to as the "motorists' consent theory." In using a state's roads, the motorist impliedly
consented to the appointment of a particular state official as his agent to accept process.
Because the agent could be personally served within the forum, the state courts gained in
personam jurisdiction over the out-of-state traveller. But see note 52 infra.
39. 326 U.S. 310, 317. Often the property within the state, in and of itself, can furnish
the minimum contacts needed for jurisdiction where it is related to the underlying contro-
versy. The best example of such a situation is where disputed claims to the property generate
the action. 97 S. Ct. at 2582.
40. See, e.g., Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (minimum contacts rule re-
quires "some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conduct-
ing activities with the forum State .... ). See generally Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
45 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930) (imposing a standard of reasonableness in determining whether
nonresident defendant must submit to jurisdiction). See also Comment, Long-Arm and Quasi
in Rem Jurisdiction and the Fundamental Test of Fairness, 69 MIcH. L. REv. 300, 309 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Comment].
41. Because there must now be minimum contacts between the forum, the property, and
the defendant, quasi in rem may be a hollow concept. Given the minimum contacts between
the forum and the defendant, it would appear that the forum could assert in personam
jurisdiction over the defendant. Although the Court impliedly overruled Harris v. Balk (see
note 30 supra), it is unclear whether the Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 216
N.E.2d 312 (1966), attachment device has also been invalidated. Seider v. Roth involved a
suit by New York residents against a Quebec resident arising out of an accident in Vermont.
The court found the automobile liability insurance policy, which a casualty insurance com-
pany had issued to the defendant, a "debt" owed to the defendant that could be seized in
attachment.
In O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Corp., 437 F. Supp. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1977), the court applied
Shaffer to a typical Seider situation. It interpreted Seider as judicially establishing a direct
action statute, thus making the insurance company the defendant in Seider-type attach-
ments. Therefore, the necessary "minimum contacts" need only be found between the suit,
the forum, and the insurance company. Thus, if the insurance company was doing business
in the forum, the requisite contact between the defendant and the forum was present, and
the nonresident policyholder's contacts with the forum need not be considered. Id. at 1004.
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have in personam jurisdiction before adjudicating any interests in
property.
Having decided that minimum contacts is the proper test, the
Court held that Delaware's assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction,
founded on the "presence" in the state of defendants' Greyhound
stock, an intangible form of property,42 presented too few contacts
with the controversy to meet due process requirements.4 3 The major-
ity could find no reasonable relationship in Shaffer to justify assert-
ing jurisdiction; the record failed to show that any of the defendants
had ever set foot in Delaware or that any act related to the plaintiff's
complaint had occurred in Delaware." But such a mechanical and
quantitative analysis of the defendants' acts in the forum violates
the spirit of International Shoe. The minimum contacts test re-
quires a more searching evaluation of the facts and circumstances
of each case to determine if it is fair to subject the defendants to
suit in the forum state.4 5
In his dissent, Justice Brennan attempted this sort of evaluation.
He looked beyond the record and noted that the nonresident defen-
dants, in voluntarily associating themselves with Delaware, re-
ceived pecuniary benefits in return for assuming fiduciary responsi-
bilities. Because of the defendants' alleged improprieties in per-
42. Arguably, Delaware's sovereign power to determine the situs of intangibles issued by
a corporation totally dependent for its existence on Delaware law was judicially curtailed.
However, this interference with the powers of the chartering state is justified, for Delaware,
by allowing Greyhound to venture far from its borders and issue intangibles like common
stock certificates outside its own jurisdiction, has relinquished its exclusive control over
Greyhound. See also Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1139 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons,
J., concurring). More importantly, due process rules, as expressed in cases like International
Shoe, limit the power of the state of incorporation to insist upon the fiction of a local situs
for its intangibles. Id. at 1131 (Gibbons, J., concurring). See also Atkinson v. Superior Ct.,
49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957) (quasi in rem action justified on basis of fairness and
minimum contacts), appeal dismissed and cert. denied sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.
v. Atkinson, 357 U.S. 569 (1958).
43. Even prior to Shaffer, the courts refused to accept the idea that intangible property
is always present within the territorial boundaries of the forum state for the purpose of
acquiring in rem jurisdiction. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 246-47 (1958); U.S.
Indus., Inc. v. Gregg, 540 F.2d 142 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2972 (1977). Cf.
Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1137 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J., concurring) (the
use of a fictional situs for intangibles cannot justify an assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction
where there are admittedly insufficient contacts with the forum to support in personam
jurisdiction). See also Andrews, Situs of Intangibles in Suits Against Nonresident Claimants,
49 YALE L.J. 241 (1939).
44. 97 S. Ct. at 2585.
45. Id. at 2580, 2591 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting). See note 36 and accompa-
nying text supra.
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forming these duties, the resident corporation suffered a serious
financial setback." Thus, there was nothing unreasonable in impos-
ing the burden of defending in Delaware on the appellants. More-
over, it would be manifestly unfair to allow the appellants to escape
prosecution in Delaware for their misdeeds, while acting on behalf
of a Delaware corporation.
Assuming some contact between the forum and the defendant,
the interest of Delaware in hearing the controversy offers further
support for the position that minimum contacts were present here.
The chartering state always has some recognizable interest in the
litigation of controversies involving acts of its corporations since its
law creates and regulates them. This state interest in overseeing the
activities of resident companies is even greater where the suit is a
derivative action brought for the benefit of local corporations. 7 If
such an action must be brought in another state and conflict of laws
principles should dictate the application of Delaware law, there is
a danger that the courts of the foreign forums will tend to confuse
Delaware corporation law and frustrate its interests. Permitting
Delaware to adjudicate these suits helps insure uniform interpreta-
tion and application of that state's corporate laws which affect thou-
sands of corporations operating throughout the United States.
Moreover, if Delaware is unable to hear such derivative actions,
many claims involving allegations of wrongdoings will never be
heard since acquiring jurisdiction in foreign forums over corporate
fiduciaries living thousands of miles away will become too expensive
for all but a few wealthy shareholders. 8
In the final analysis, courts must evaluate assertions of jurisdic-
tion by determining if it is fair to subject a nonresident to local suit.
46. 97 S. Ct. at 2591-92 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
47. See Jonnet v. Dollar Sav. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1139 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring). See also Gordon v. Michel, 297 A.2d 420, 422 (Del. Ch. 1972) (Delaware has a
valid interest in requiring defendant's appearance in derivative suits since the corporation is
organized in Delaware and its activities are regulated by Delaware law). The majority did
not evaluate the state's interests in hearing derivative suits because the sequestration statute
was not specifically enacted to govern this type of action. See note 18 supra.
48. See 97 S. Ct. at 2591 & n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICr OF LAWS § 309 (1971)). See generally Folk & Moyer, supra
note 5, at 795-96. The importance of Delaware corporation law is exemplified by the sheer
number of American corporations it governs. One-half of the companies listed on the New
York Stock Exchange and over one-third of those on the American Stock Exchange are
incorporated in Delaware. National Division of the Wilmington Trust Co., Why Delaware
(1973-74).
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Thus, even if another state has a superior interest in hearing the
controversy, as long as the forum's interest in permitting its courts
to hear the controversy comports with "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice," the constitutional rights of other
states are not breached.49 As Brennan declared, courts should be
only concerned with "minimum" and not "best" contacts2
Although there is nothing unfair in Delaware's requiring officers
and directors in a domestic corporation to submit to the chartering
state's jurisdiction in derivative suits involving corporate affairs,
the particular device used here to accomplish this worthwhile objec-
tive, sequestration, is cumbersome and inefficient and contravenes
due process. After Shaffer, Delaware must devise a method of ac-
quiring jurisdiction over nonresident corporate officials that in-
volves little effort, cost, and delay, and is within constitutional limi-
tations.' The Court impliedly suggested that Delaware resolve this
dilemma by using a consent statute, a method of gaining jurisdic-
tion popular in other states. These statutes make acceptance of
directorship the equivalent of consent to the chartering state's juris-
diction and have been held constitutionally sound. 2
Another possible solution is for Delaware to enact a special long-
arm statute granting its courts in personam jurisdiction over nonres-
ident directors and officers. The scope of the statute should limit
jurisdictional power to litigation in which Delaware has a clear in-
terest in furthering the uniform application and interpretation of its
corporate laws, as in shareholder derivative suits involving local
corporations.53 This long-arm statute would undoubtedly meet with
49. See Jonnet v. Dollar Say. Bank, 530 F.2d 1123, 1140-41 (3d Cir. 1976) (Gibbons, J.,
concurring); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930); Comment, supra
note 40, at 338.
50. 97 S. Ct. at 2593 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
51. See generally Folk & Moyer, supra note 5, at 796-800.
52. See 97 S. Ct. at 2586 & n.47, citing as examples of consent statutes enacted in other
jurisdictions: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 33-322 (West Supp. 1971); S.C. CODE § 33-5-70 (1976).
The constitutionality of both consent statutes was upheld. Weil v. Beresth, 26 Conn. 428, 225
A. 2d 826 (1966); Wagenberg v. Charleston Wood Prods., 122 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.S.C. 1954).
Brennan objected to the use of consent statutes as possible foundations for jurisdiction for
he saw them as a fictional outgrowth of Pennoyer's territorial limitations on a court's in
personam jurisdiction. These laws should be cast aside now that the objectionable jurisdic-
tional framework developed in Pennoyer has been eliminated. 97 S. Ct. at 2592 (Brennan,
J., concurring and dissenting).
53. Long arm jurisdiction is the personal jurisdiction courts exert over nonresident defen-
dants without obtaining personal service of process within the state and must be grounded
on a constitutional long-arm statute. See ALl, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN
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constitutional approval. The Supreme Court has ruled that where
a nonresident's activities are of special concern to the forum state,
the nonresident may be subject to personal service of process. '"
Consent statutes and long-arm laws may not be perfect methods
of securing jurisdiction over nonresident corporate fiduciaries. Un-
like sequestration, however, both have been held a constitutional
exercise of state power and thus are superior jurisdictional devices.
It is important that a proper perspective be maintained with juris-
dictional issues, for courts and lawyers must be reminded that juris-
diction is merely preliminary and should be resolved with minimal
fanfare so that the merits of the case can be litigated without unnec-
essary delay.5
Ted Tishman
STATE AND FEDERAL COuRTS 375-79 (Official Draft 1969). See Folk & Moyer, supra note 5, at
798.
54. See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957) (issuance by
mail of a single life insurance policy was a sufficient contact for California to exercise jurisdic-
tion over the nonresident insurer since California had a significant interest in overseeing
insurance transactions negotiated with its residents).
55. See Comment, supra note 40, at 317.
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